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SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1945-1946

of the Civil Practice Act, no court shall set aside, quash or stay
any execution except upon notice of motion for that relief to "the
opposite party, or his attorney of record." 5 1 Reliance was placed
on that section by the judgment debtor in Holmes v. Fanyo,52 to
prevent further proceedings under a judgment more than seven
years old,53 despite the creditor's claim that the period for which
proceedings had been stayed should not be counted, 54 on the ground
that any stay order which might have been granted was void for
lack of notice to the judgment debtor. It appeared that the stay
order had been granted at the request of an intervening petitioner
who claimed an interest in the judgment. Notice to support such
order had apparently been given by such intervenor only to the
judgment creditor. The court concluded that the "opposite party"
referred to in Section 70 had to be a person who would be adversely
affected by the stay order, meant but a single person, and could
apply only to a judgment creditor. As notice to the judgment
debtor was deemed unnecessary, the court therefore decided that
the stay had been a valid one so the judgment, and execution thereunder, were still enforcible.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In only one case during the period of this survey has it been
necessary for the courts to attempt to define the substantive elements of a crime. The indictment returned in the case of People
v. HardtI' charged the defendant with the crime of malicious mischief in defacing a certain dwelling house.2 It further charged
that the dwelling in question was in the lawful possession of certain persons "who were then and there lessees of said building"
and that the acts done were done without the consent of such
lessees. Defendant's motion to quash the indictment was sustained
by the trial court on the ground that the statute made such acts
51.11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 194.

52326 Ill. App. 624, 63 N. ED. (24) 249 (1945).
5s nil. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 6.
54 Ibid., § 2.
1329 Ill. App. 153, 67 N. E. (2d) 487 (1946).
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 425.
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criminal only if done "without the consent of the owner" and
that, in the absence of such an allegation in the indictment no
offense had been charged. That ruling was reversed, on writ of
error by the prosecution, 3 on the ground that the term "owner,"
as used in the statute in question, was not confined to persons
holding fee simple title but included forms of conditional ownership such as would exist in lessees or other persons entitled to, or
actually in, possession of the premises. Cases with similar hold4
ings may be found in other states.
Most of the cases in this field, however, deal with procedural
points. Inconsistency in pleading between the purport clause and
the tenor clause in an indictment charging forgery, for example,
was regarded as sufficient, in People v. Nickols,5 to require reversal
of the conviction even though the defendant had pleaded guilty.
The indictment there concerned recited that the defendant had
forged a check purporting to have been made by one Clark for the
payment of money to one Crow, but unnecessarily continued, in
the tenor clause, to set out the instrument in haec verba. The
instrument there reproduced was lacking in the name of a payee,
so as to be an entirely different instrument from the one referred
to. Such variance was regarded as presenting a fatal defect in
the indictment of technical nature but nevertheless of such importance that it could not be disregarded. While no prior Illinois
case exists on the point, the holding is supported by decisions
elsewhere 0
Although a plea of guilty is generally said to constitute an
admission of all facts charged in an indictment,7 an important
qualification has been placed on that rule by the decision in People
v. Langford.8 The defendant was there charged with the crime of
armed robbery under a one-count indictment which also contained
Ibid., § 747.
See State v. Whittier, 21 Me. 341, 38 Am. Dec. 272 (1842) ; People v. Horr, 7
Barb. (N. Y.) 9 (1849) ; State v. Gilligan, 23 R. I. 400, 50 A. 844 (1901) ; State v.
Mathes & Mills, 71 Tenn. (3 Lea) 36 (1879).
5 391 Ill. 565, 63 N. E. (2d) 759 (1945).
%See cases cited in 37 C. J. S., Forgery, § 55, notes 25-35.
7 People v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549, 25 N. E. (2d) 6 (1940).
8 392 Ill. 584, 65 N. E. (2d) 440 (1946).
3

4
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allegations respecting certain earlier convictions for other offenses,
warranting the more severe punishment imposed on an habitual
offender. After plea of guilty, he was sentenced pursuant to the
terms of the Habitual Criminal ActY It was held, on writ of error,
that the plea of guilty amounted solely to an admission of the facts
charged insofar as they constituted ingredients of the offense of
armed robbery and did not admit the allegations respecting the
prior convictions since the same were merely matters of aggravation and no part of the crime charged. In the absence of specific
admission with respect thereto or a precise finding by the court,
based on evidence, that the defendant was an habitual criminal, it
was held error to impose more than the statutory penalty for the
specific crime.
An attempted innovation in practice in the trial of criminal
cases before a jury was nullified by the holding in People v.
Jonerth.10 The trial judge, in the absence of defense testimony,
had there directed the jury to confine themselves first, and solely,
with the question of defendant's guilt. Upon receipt of oral advice
that the jury had found the defendant guilty, the trial judge
directed the jury to resume their places in the jury box and the
trial was then continued as to the question of punishment. Additional testimony indicated that defendant had been a recidivist so,
upon proper instructions, the jury eventually returned with a second and written verdict finding the defendant guilty and imposing
the maximum punishment. Judgment thereon was reversed on
the ground that it was error to receive two verdicts in the same
case and that the jury should, before retiring to deliberate, receive
evidence not only as to guilt but also such as would enable them to
fix the punishment. The attempt to split the trial into two parts
was condemned although the court recognized that a different
procedure might be proper had the defendant pleaded guilty."
Might not justice have been served better had the practice been
approved? If the hearing as to guilt is separated from that as to
punishment, there is occasion to believe that convictions based on
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602.
10 328 I1. App. 349, 66 N. E. (2d) 108 (1946).
- People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N. E. 739, 77 A. L. R. 1199 (1931).
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bad reputation rather than because of actual guilt would be less
likely to occur. Had the defendant testified, the aggravating factors may have been adduced to affect his credibility, 1 2 but certainly could not have been used to establish guilt. 13
Prior to 1933, a motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment,
when made in a criminal case, could be made in writing but might
be made orally. 1 4 In that year the legislature amended the statute
so as to provide that such motions "shall be made in writing."'15
The mandatory character of the amended statute was, for the first
time, noted in People v. Jankowski16 where it was held that an
oral motion in arrest of judgment was insufficient to preserve
errors committed by the trial court.
Two other points concerning the trial of a criminal case might
be noted. While the court, in People ex rel. Ross v. Ragen,17 was
astute to note that a proceeding to secure a writ of habeas corpus,
even to secure relief from a criminal sentence, is essentially a
civil suit, so that the constitutional' 8 and statutory 19 provisions
respecting the furnishing of counsel to indigent prisoners were
inapplicable, it seems to have overlooked another statuory provision on the point applicable to civil suits. 20 Two sentences to be
served in the same place will run concurrently in the absence of
specific designation otherwise, 2' but that rule does not apply,
according to People v. Keinay,2 2 where the sentences are to be
12 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 734; People v. Fitzgibbons, 346 Ill. 338, 179 N. E.
106 (1931).
13 People v. Lane, 300 I1. 422, 133 N. E. 267 (1921).
14 People v. Cohen, 352 Ill. 380, 185 N. E. 608, 88 A. L. R. 481 (1933) ; People v.
Goldberg, 287 Ill. 238, 122 N. E. 530 (1919).
15 Laws 1933, pp. 465-6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 747.
16391 Il. 298, 63 N. E. (2d) 362 (1945).
17 391 Ill. 419, 63 N. E. (2d) 874, 162 A. L. R. 920 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvIEw 357.
is Il. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 730.
20 Ibid., Ch. 33, § 5.
21 People ex rel. Clancy v. Graydon, 329 Ill. 398, 160 N. E. 748 (1928).
22 391 Ill. 572, 63 N. E. (2d) 733 (1945).
Smith, J., dissented.
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served in different institutions, particularly if those institutions
23
are of unlike character.
Some questions concerning review of criminal sentences might
also be noted. The exact counterpart of the problem posed in the
civil case of Lukas v. Lukas2 was involved in the criminal case of
People v. Kobley.25 There the defendant was granted sixty days
in which to prepare and file a bill of exceptions. The bill. was
tendered and marked "presented" within apt time but was retained by counsel for almost four years. No order of extension of
time was obtained. Thereafter, the same was signed and ordered
filed nunc pro tunc and a writ of error was obtained. Just as in
the civil case, a motion to strike the bill of exceptions was sustained on the ground that the bill must be not only signed but also
filed within the period fixed by rule or any proper enlargement
thereof. 26 If not so presented and filed, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.
Limitations on the time within which review may be had in
criminal cases, whether by writ of error or by motion in the nature
of a writ of error coram nobis, have been given inflexible application in two recent cases despite claims made by the interested
persons that the period of incarceration should be deducted be27
cause the individual was "under duress." In People v. Chapman
a writ of error sued out twenty-seven years after conviction was
quashed, on the ground that the period of limitation fixed by the
common law at twenty years had expired,28 even though the
prisoner claimed that the prison authorities had, until recently,
denied any inmate the right to prepare or file writs or legal papers
29
in any court. A somewhat similar claim, made in People v. Rave
23 A conviction for the crime of escape from the Illinois State Farm was affirmed
despite defendant's claim that he had, during the period fixed for confinement
therein, also been confined in the state penitentiary on another charge, on the
ground the institutions were of unlike character.
24381 Ill. 429, 45 N. E. (2d) 869 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
247.
25 390 Il.
565, 62 N. F&(2d) 454 (1945).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.70A.
27 392 Ill. 168, 64 N. E. (2d) 529 (1946).
28 People v. Murphy, 296 Ill. 532, 129 N. E. 868 (1921), declares that the commonlaw period applies to the writ of error when used in criminal cases rather than the
shorter period fixed for the use of the same writ in civil cases.
29392 111. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946).
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with respect to a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis filed more than eight years after conviction had been
affirmed, 80 was likewise ineffective.31
Once review of a criminal conviction has been had under a
writ of error, no further review is possible. Attempts to grant
further review by way of writ of habeas corpus were nullified in
People ex rel. Stead v. Superior Court.32 The same result was
reached in People v. Thompson,33 where the attempt was made
through the use of a second writ of error. Ordinary principles of
res adjudicata were applied to achieve that result.
Distinct disadvantage to the convicted person who has served
part of his sentence would seem to follow, according to People v.
Wilson,3 4 if he should seek reversal of an invalid sentence by writ
of error, for he cannot thereby obtain judicial credit upon the
subsequently rendered valid judgment for the period of incarceration under the invalid one., In that case, the defendant had
been imprisoned under a judgment fixing maximum and minimum
limits in the manner prescribed by the former Sentence and Parole
Act.835 That judgment was held invalid, on writ of error, after
defendant had served some three years of the 'sentence imposed.
Upon remandment, defendant sought to have the new and valid
judgment, pursuant to the present Sentence and Parole Act, 36
entered nwnc pro tune as of the date of the original sentence in
order to obtain the benefit of the time already served. It was
held that, by securing relief under a writ of error, the defendant
30 The limitation period is five years according to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110,

§ 196.
31 Counsel also argued, in People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N. E. (2d) 23 (1946),
that the five-year period of limitation, since it was fixed by the Civil Practice Act,
could have no application to criminal cases. That contention was repudiated on
the strength of earlier decisions resting on prior practice acts. While the statute
in question bears the short title of "Civil Practice Act," it is really one designed
to regulate "practice and procedure In the courts of this state." Moreover, the
original writ of error coram nobis, whether used in civil or in criminal matters,
was a new suit essentially civil in nature: Chapman v. North American Life Ins.
Co., 292 Ill. 179, 126 N. E. 732 (1920).
32 234"Ill. 186, 84 N. E. 875, 14 Ann. Cas. 753 (1908).
as 392 Ill. 589, 65 N. E. (2d) 362 (1946).
s4 391 Ill. 463, 63 N. E. (2d) 488 (1945).
38 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 560; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq. The socalled "recommendation" of the trial court there provided for was declared unconstitutional in People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N. E. (2d) 569 (1942).
Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 802.
386
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had lost the advantage of his prior service, could not be sentenced
nunc pro tunc, and could obtain relief, if at all, only through the
3
offices of the Division of Correction. 7
There is intimation in the case of United States ex rel Mazy v.
Ragen 5 that there is no necessity to impanel a jury to ascertain
whether a convicted person has been restored to sanity, he having
been previously found to be insane, before proceeding with sentence. As the writ of habeas corpus there sought was denied for
failure to exhaust state remedies, the statement may be regarded
as dictum. The imputation, however, would seem to conflict with
39
the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Scott
where it was indicated that, in the absence of specific provision in
the statute, 40 jury trial on the question of restoration to sanity was
a necessary corollary to trial by jury to determine insanity in the
first instance.
V. FAMILY LAW
Since the legislature first acted in 1861, the emancipation of
the married woman has gone steadily forward until today she
occupies virtually the same position as a feme sole. Some restrictions, however, still remain to hamper her freedom. One of these,
as pointed out by the case of People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky,' is that
a married woman cannot continue to use her maiden name for
purposes of voting after marriage but, upon marriage, must register anew under her husband's name in order to retain her right to
vote. The Appellate Court found the provisions of the Election
Code in this respect to be mandatory and not discretionary in
character. 2 It has generally been assumed that one could change a
37 The court distinguished the case of Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 760,
220 S. W. 1045 (1920), on the ground that the sentence there concerned was not
imposed under an unconstitutional statute nor was it an indeterminate one.
38 149 F. (2d) 948 (1945), reversing 55 F. Supp. 143 (1944).

39326 Ii1. 327, 157 N. E. 247 (1927).
40 InI. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 593.
1327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N. E. (2d) 642 (1945),
N. E. (2d) 422 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 46, § 6-54.

cause transferred 390 Ill. 70, 60

